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Why Juveniles Should Not Be
Tried as Adults
Micllae! Baiky'

W!Jnz juvmilts are prostmttd as adults, tlu caust ofjuvmile crimt is ignored
and aaurbaud, juvmiks art dmitd various constitutional rigbts, and ovtrly
rmibutivt punishments art pmcribttl.

A

dolescence involves character evolution. During this growing period,
certain adolescent acts may not remain a part of one's behavioral patterns forever. H owever, in response to juvenile criminal acts, society develops intense feelings of disgust and hatred toward the individual, which often
result in severe punishment. Consequently, society permanently punishes
adolescents for what may be transitory actions. The public condemns
teenage criminals as degenerate and incapable of repemance, rallying behind
the idea that those who commit adult crimes should "do adult rime." Rehabilitation is a fundamental component of the juvenile justice system because
it can positively influence an adolescent's disposition and, in turn, better society. When juveniles are prosecuted as adults, the cause of juvenile crime is
ignored and exacerbated, juveniles are denied various constitutional rights,
and overly retributive punishments are prescribed.
THE PROBLEM OBSCURED

United Scares juvenile justice systems have significant limitations interfering with their ability to function properly. Legislators have held numerous policy debates on the issue of juvenile justice. In one debate, Florida
Congressman Bill McCollum stated that "the juvenile justice systems of the
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nation ... are broken.''' McCollum explained that there is a lack of resources
devoted to programs and the systems are overwhelmed.! Wirhout sufficient
funding it is impossible for states ro adequately deal with juvenile offenders.
In State of Louisiana v. Tony Ray Ervin, the fifteen-year-old defendant was
sentenced to two consecutive nine-year jail sentences because the juvenile
fucilicies were inadequate for the type of correctional treatment thar he
needed. Ervin was thereby remanded to adult facilities fraught with possible
dangers to him. The state sentenced Ervin as an adult because he "was in
need of correctional treatment best provided by a custodial environment."3
Instead of focusing on the real problem of inappropriate juvenile sysrems,
the state pawned Ervin off as a reprehensible criminal and sent him to jail.
Convicting him as an adult relieved the state of any responsibility for its
judicial policy shortcomings. However, by incarcerating Ervin with adult
felons, the scare also subjected him ro the possibility of detrimental adult role
models and other negative influences.
In another policy debate, Congressman Bobby Scott of the House Judiciary Committee claimed that jailing juveniles as adults increases their likelihood of becoming repeat offenders.4 Prisons that house both juveniles
and adults can be considered ''crime schools" because older inmates teach
younger ones how to commit crimes and avoid consequences. Scott quotes
Senaror Birch Byah as saying, "Innocent teenagers emerge from jail streetwise. Even a brief stay in jail, rather than deterring crime, may just make a
juvenile more sophisticated and less Likely to be caught at his next offense.''s
Prisons acting as "crime schools" is only one of the many problems afflicting
state juvenile justice systems. \Xlhile states continue ro ignore and deny their
internal inadequacies, the problem of juvenile crime is exacerbated.
In addition, not only do states have different standards for prosecuting
adolescents as adults, but some state courts rely on their own psychological
tests of age. In People ofthe State ofColorado v. Shawn L. Rivem, the juvenile
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Chai Feldblum, Moderator Symposium, "Juvenile Justice: Reform after One-Hundred
Years," American Crimina/law Review 37 (Fall 2000): 418.
' Ibid.
' Srau v. Ervin, 32 430 LA (1999).
• Fddblum, I.fl8.
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defendant stood trial as an adult because che court determined that he was
"more mamre chan his chronological age indicated. "6 In chis case the Colorado court disregarded the defendant's actual age and assumed the responsibility of determining his maturity for the purpose of crying him as an adult.
In contrast, che Washington, D.C., court in Gregory Lucas v. U.S. esrablished
chat juvenile courts should have exclusive jurisdiction over adolescents accused of criminal acts.7 Why should this standard be enacted in one state but
suspended in another? If maturity is indeed the main consideration in criminal prosecution, it is only logical that nineteen- or rwenty-year-old offenders be evaluated and tried as juveniles if their maturity is not reflected in
cheir chronological age. This double standard does not seem to bother the
current juvenile justice policymakers, but perhaps it should.
Furthermore, courts can use actions of juvenile defendants as a basis for
crying chem as adults. In Corry jermo Conner v. State ofA1'kansas, the seventeenyear-old defendant endured an intense interrogation in which the police
used "good-cop, bad-cop" tactics wichouc any legal representation present.
This can be extremely intimidating to youth, especiaJly without an advocate
in attendance. Since Conner was physically larger than the detectives and
showed no remo rse in the face of relentless accusations, the court ruled him
competent to stand trial as an adult.' Once agajn che court ignored the juvenile defendant's actual age and drew their own conclusions about his maturity based upon his actions during questioning. The power of stare courts
to decide which juveniles should be tried as adults creates an obvious flaw in
the justice system by selectively holding some youth to a different standard
chan others.
PROTECTING CoNSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS

Juveniles' constitutional rights are in danger of being abused. Certain
constitutional freedoms like Miranda rights require special consideration
when applied to juveniles.Wlllle the Constitution allows adults to waive

6

People u. Rivem, 968 P1d 1061 CO (1997).

-Lucas u. U.S., 521 A2d 876 DC (1987).

• Comur v. State, 34+ 457 AR (1998).
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these rights if they choose, certainly before waiving their rights, juveniles
should receive advice from a competent, crusted adult instead of an unfamiliar authority figure like a police officer. In State ofNew Hampshire v. jason
FarrelL the court claimed that an adult need not be present for a juvenile to
waive his or her Miranda rights.• Miranda rights are a critical component
of the Constinttion and officials should not hastily encourage adolescents co
relinquish them.
In addition, since the court grants adulrs due process protections regarding rules of evidence as a safeguard against biased and inflan1marory
prosecution, it should award juveniles no less. In che case of State ofArizona
v. Orlander Beasley, che fourteen-year-old defendant was described as a
"chronic felony offender."' 0 The court used his juvenile record co determine
his status for erial as an adult. Paradoxically, rhis record could nor be used as
evidence in the erial irself. The State of Arizona denied the juvenile defendant proper due process protection by employing the very evidence prohibited from being used in the court case to determine his status as an adult for
the trial. This blatant double standard regarding the uses of evidence is unfair and unconstitutionaL In rhe case of Lucas v. United States, the appeUanc
court found rhat the erial court erred in admitting certain evidence. Specifi
cally, "rhe trial court erred in failing sau sponte co caution the jury ... that it
should not consider the contradictory grand jury testimony presented as evidence."11 In chis case the court negligently allowed the jury to be influenced
by proscribed evidence. The court again prevented tl1e adolescent defendant
from proper due process protection by admitting inappropriate
evidence co che erial. When youth are tried, they should be extended due
process protection from preliminary hearings throughout the entire process.
Until recently, due process protection for juveniles seemed unnecessary.
In his Catholic University Law Review article Thomas Wagman points out
that the Supreme Court advanced juvenile procedural due process rights in
Kent v. United States: "Prior co chis case, society did not consider juveniles
'criminals'; and thus, an assumption existed chat they did not need che due

• Stutt t>. Fa~n/1, 98497 NH (zoot).
.. sw~ v. B~.:zslry. I CA-CR 99-o899 AZ (2000).
II Lll<•ts v. u.s.
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process protections afforded to adults." 12 Although juveniles might not have
been regarded as criminals, upon standing erial they should be afforded the
same rights as adults, including those of due process. Due process protection
is predicated on proper rules of evidence. It is critical that juveniles be extended the fre·edoms and rights the Constitution created for all citizens.
REHABILITATION IN jUVENILE JuSTICE

Juvenile justice systems exist to ascertain and enact what is best for
youth. Often this entails rehabilitation, which gives juvenile criminals the
opportunity ro develop their positive character traits and diminishes their
danger to society. In the In re L. J , the District of Columbia Appeals Court
commented,
The theory of the District's Juvenile Court ... is rooted in the social welfare philosophy rather than the corpus juris.... The objectives are to provide measures of guidance and rehabilitation for the child and protection
for sociery, not ro fix criminal responsibiliry, guilt, and punishmem.'l
This ruling outlines the juvenile court's defining purpose-to guide and rehabilitate children by providing direction ro convicted youth. The Washington, D.C., court scared that senrencing should focus on rehabilitation, while
the state should act as a parenral figure rather than a prosecutor or judge. 14
Furthermore, taking a parental approach would help channel yourh in
appropriate directions instead of simply punishing them for their mistakes.
States deliberately give harsher sentences to teach adolescents a lesson.
President Mark Soler of the Washington, D .C., Youth Law Cenrer points
out that adolescents are required by law to be incarcerated separately from
adults." However, the overwhelmed juvenile justice system lets the adult
criminal justice system handle many youth offenders. This causes numerous

a: Matthew Thomas Wagm:m "Innocence Lose In dte Wake of Green, tht Trend is Clear
if You are Old Enough ro Do me Crime, Then You are Old Enough to Do me Time" C.uholic
University Law Revit'W 49 (Winter 2.000): 649.
a.• In l't! L. ]., 546 A2d 429 DC (1988).

•• Ibid.
IS Ibid.
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negative effeccs for convicted juveniles. In K L. J v. State ofOklahoma, the
judge was concerned that state juvenile facilities would be unable to provide
the type of treatment that the defendant needed, so the judge sentenced
K. L. J. with jail time.·~ In addition, in State v. Ervin the courts said, "Lesser
sentences than those actually imposed would depreciate the seriousness of
rhe offenses."'" In this case the stare was intent on sending a message ro the
defendant instead of reaching correct behaviors. Unfortunately, this articude
means more juvenile criminals face the terrible consequence of harsh prison
sentences, while the public forgers that rehabilitation is not synonymous
with leniency. 18
Furchermore, when juveniles are incarcerated with aduJcs, they are subject ro rhe detrimental influences of adult criminals. Poor adulr role models
instill damaging perceptions into adolescents' minds. According ro Congressman Scott, although crying more children as adults may reduce the actual rime spenr in prison, studies indicate that rhe crime rate increases as a
result. 19 With convicted felons as examples, incarcerated juveniles pick up extremely bad habics. Although the courcs intend ro deter juveniles from crime
by imposing harsh punishments, it appears that imposing adult sentences
may have the opposite effect. By passing on rhe responsibility of trying
youth to adulr courts, juvenile courcs are taking rhe easy way our instead of
f.1cing the realities of the situation.
VINDICTIVE PUNISHMENT

Laws designed for adults often prescribe overly harsh mandatory punishments for juvenile offenders. As the Colorado Appeals Court claims,
"The fixing of prison terms for specific crimes involves a substantial penological judgment and that, as a general matter, is properly within the
province of legislatures, not courcs."!O Certainly the courts cannot set
mandatory sentences, but that does not make these statures correct even

16

K L.}. v. Stare, CR 22, 824 P.2d 361 (OK 1990).
,. State v. Ervin.
11 /n l'l L. j.

•• Fddblum, 1421.
·' Qrd. In Peopk V. Mo)•a, 899 P2d 212 CO (1994).
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when they are passed by state legislatures. A North Carolina statute exemplifies this type of incorrect fixed punishment by seating that life imprisonment is mandatory for a first degree sexual assault conviction. However, in
"State of North Carolina v. Green [the courc] concludes that although che
transfer statutes are constitutionally valid ... the imposition of the mandarory life sentence in this case is cruel or unusual punishment" for juvenile
defendants.~• The imposition of mandatory life imprisonment is not the
right way ro handle juvenile offenses because it is too punitive. A life tainted
by a severely harsh punishment breeds nothing productive, and a mandatory
life sentence diminishes a juvenile's chance to reform and become a productive member of society. Clearly such harsh punishments can be excessive and
can easily destroy young lives.
While there are exceptions in specific cases, generally, severe sentences
seem to harm convicted adolescents more than they help. Fortunately, some
courts have recognized these destructive actions and taken the appropriate
steps to correct them. In Florida an appeals court overturned the death sentence for Keith Brennan, a sixteen-year-old convict. The court ruled that
Brennan's rehabilitative potential was not established as part of the penalty
phase of the trial.12 In Ex Parte Burgess, the Alabama court affirmed Roy
Burgess, Jr.'s conviction for murder, bur reversed the decision on a death sentence and remande-d it for resentencing because the court "improperly considered defendant's juvenile adjunctions to negate mitigating circumstances
it found co exisr."~3 Similarly, in the case of People of Colorado v. joseph
Daniel Moya the Colorado Appeals court reduced Moya's sentence from life
without the possibility of parole ro life and parole after forty years.:4 Courts
are recognizing that excessive punishments are more harmful than helpful.
Although courts still want to send the message that crime will be punished,
they are beginning to acknowledge that rehabilitation is possible.

11

11

Wagman 642.
B1"1!nnan v. State, 7H So1d I (FL 1999).

~· Ex Pam Burgm,
14

Ptoplt v. Moya.

r98o81o AL (20oo).
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PossiBLE REFoRMs

Making amends is feasible only if society admits that the problems of
the U.S. criminal justice system are real and deserve to be addressed. In the
Connecticut Journal of International Law, Eric Sentlinger claims that England's laws regarding youth offenders provide a blueprint for ending similar
problems faced in the United States.~s Many citizens of England subscribe ro
the philosophy that no civilized society holds children accotmrable like
adults and that the "wisdom of protecting young children against the full
rigor of criminal law is beyond argwnent." 26 In crimes at which the public is
outraged, England refuses to try juvenile criminals as adults in an attempt to
lend legitimacy to their juvenile courts. The United States would benefit
from adopting certain parts of England's laws such as the protection from
full criminal prosecution. Other possible reforms include Robert Henderson's approach outlined in the Montana Law Review. Henderson posits a
possible method of combining juvenile and adult punishments to increase
rehabilitation. Under this system, a juvenile may undergo rehabilitation in
the purview of juvenile courts, yet be sentenced to a ptmishment of similar
lengtl1 for committing an adult crime. 27
Juvenile justice policymakers must recognize that juveniles and adults
have different needs. Certainly, both deserve the same right to due process
of law. Adults and adolescents should have an equal chance for rehabilitation
ro overcome their crimes, bur tl1e processes should differ. Juveniles should be
given more opportunities to reform themselves because, according to In re
L. ]., it is the duty of the courts to give guidance to adolescent criminals and
rehabilitate them. 28 Getting tl1is support is extremely difficult because as
Henderson states, "many believe that today's juvenile offenders are a new
breed of 'super-predators."'~9 Public sentiment proclaims that society must

"' Eric D. Sendinger, "U.S. v. United Kingdom: Is Ira 'New Deal' for Prosecucing Children
as Adults," Connecticut Journal ofInternational Law 16 (woo): u6.
"' Qtd in Sendinger, u 6.
" Robert E. Henderson, "Blended Sentencing in Momana: A New Way to Look at an Old
Problem" Montana Law Review 6r (Summer woo): 336.
" In re L. J.
" Henderson, 337·
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"get tough" on juvenile crime:10 As the public clamors for vengeance and retribution, the cotu·ts comply.
CoNCLUSION

Courts avoid their governmental responsibility ro protect rights by refusing to acknowledge that rhe juvenile justice system is flawed. The system's
shortcomings prevent juvenile offenders from receiving proper protection of
their rights and undermine their ability ro overcome their mistakes. Courts
need to focus on rehabilitation for juveniles, acting in the best interest of the
accused youth. While concentrating efforts on rehabilitation, it is also necessary for courts to refrain from lllmecessarily harsh sentencing. Vindictive
punishments contribute to increased juvenile crime, and overly harsh
mandatory punishments impede reform. Possible reforms with rehabilitation tailored to the unique needs of adolescents would enable juvenile justice systems to function more effectively.
Public officials fail to adequately consider the needs of juveniles in their
creation and enactment of the juvenile justice system. Adolescents accused
of crimes are the victims, whether innocent or not, of an underfunded and
unsupported justice system that robs them of second chances. Young criminals face intense negative prejudice from society and the government.
"' Ibid.

